London Branch Seminar
Where should we intervene to address mental health problems - on the person (specifically, on their brain), or on their environment? Enactivists have championed the view that we are not our brains, seeing mindedness instead as constituted by a whole human being’s relations with its environment. Some have also relied on this view to champion environmental as opposed to brain-focused interventions for mental health. The paper asks to what extent enactivism is sufficient, and indeed necessary, as a foundation for environmental mental health interventions.
Edward Harcourt, a Fellow of Keble College, Oxford, since 2005, works in ethics and moral psychology. His publications cover (among other things) neo-Aristotelianism and child development, ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis, the moral emotions, love and virtue, Nietzsche’s ethics, and the philosophy of mental health and mental illness. He convened the Meaning and Mindedness seminars (Tavistock Clinic 2010-15), was PI on the AHRC network ‘The Development of Character: Attachment Theory and the Moral Psychology of Vice and Virtue’ and on the Wellcome/ISSF project ‘Therapeutic Conflicts: Co-Producing Meaning in Mental Health’, and is a Director of the Oxford Summer Schools in Philosophy and Psychiatry. He is currently on secondment as Director of Research at the AHRC.
Full programme for the term attached.