‘Selfless assertions’ in the classroom 
BEN KOTZEE (University of Birmingham)

According to normative views of assertion, assertion is a norm-governed practice. A number of possible norms for assertion have been proposed, e.g., that one should (only) assert: (i) what one seriously believes, (ii) what is true, (iii) what is well-evidenced, or, (iv) what one knows. Jennifer Lackey provides one of the best-known arguments for an evidentialist norm of assertion. She holds that, rather than what one believes or what one knows, one should assert what is well-evidenced or – in her version – ‘reasonable to assert’. In this paper, I criticise Lackey’s account of assertion as sometimes being ‘selfless’. I hold that the idea of assertion is fundamentally personal. I hold that assertion as a speech act could not have evolved (and does not make sense) without the idea of the asserter truly believing what they assert. I hold that, contrary to what Lackey holds, assertion as a professional performance also depends on honest, personal assertion and that, likewise, the idea of selfless professional assertion undermines professional performance.