The Right against Mental Interference
Professor Thomas Douglas (Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics)

16:00 – 17:30

It is standardly thought that we all possess a right against interference with our bodies. Do we also possess an analogous right against interference with our minds? This has not been much discussed, but I will defend the view that we do. The paper has three parts. I first offer a rough working account of the right against bodily interference that is implicit in common sense thinking, and use this to derive a schematic account of an analogous right against mental interference. I then offer an abductive argument for the view that we possess this right: I argue that our possession of the right can better explain the impermissibility of certain forms of brainwashing than can the most obvious alternative explanations. Finally, I offer a brief theoretical defence of the right. This defence appeals both to the idea that it is disrespectful to interfere with a person’s agency, and to the thought that we enjoy property rights over our own minds.